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At Christmas of 1987 Chase Untermeyer offered to undertake a low visibility transition planning operation. Bush agreed, though he insisted on extreme discretion, since at that time it was by no means certain that Bush would survive the Republican primaries, much less be elected the next November. Later in the campaign it became likely that Untermeyer would become the director of Presidential Personnel in a future Bush Administration. Nevertheless, Bush forbade him to take any steps to assemble the beginnings of a personnel operation. He could not set up an office, establish mail handling operations, create computer programs, or even recruit his own staff, much less do any actual personnel planning. Bush also insisted that the small operation be entirely separate from the campaign and from the Office of the Vice-President.3
Symbolic Changes
President Reagan paved the way for the hoped-for Bush transition in unprecedented ways. In contrast with the lukewarm support Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson gave their Vice Presidents, Reagan campaigned long and hard for Bush, traveling many thousands of miles and visiting key states. Personnel changes in the cabinet in 1988 were molded to fit Bush priorities: Attorney General Meese resigned; and Secretaries of Education, Treasury, and Justice were appointed who were acceptable to Bush and whom he would keep on in his Administration. Immediately after the election resignations were requested from all Reagan political appointees so that a newly inaugurated President Bush would not be the one to deliver the bad news.
Despite all of these careful preparations, President
Elect Bush faced a difficult situation in the transition to his own presidency. His campaign made it clear that he saw no need for basic changes in direction from the Reagan Presidency; there would be policy continuity between the two presidencies. This made it more difficult for Bush to establish his own Administration and not seem merely to preside over a third Reagan term.
Thus in his first months in office President
Bush engaged in what might be called "the semeiotics of dissimilarity," that is, symbolic changes.4 During the transition and inauguration the extended Bush family was highly visible, a subtle contrast to the Reagans' family disputes, with three books by Reagan children casting unfavorable light on the Reagans as parents. The President met very publicly with Black leaders on Martin Luther King day ceremonies, a sharp contrast with President Reagan who had criticized the motives of civil rights leaders in a television appearance in the last week of his presidency.5
The President's early public statements placed heavy emphasis on the importance that high ethical standards
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The fact that the transition to a Bush Administration was a "friendly takeover" was a mixed blessing.
would play in his administration, a not-so-subtle contrast with what had become known as the "sleaze factor" in the Reagan Administration. But this issue turned around to bite him several weeks later when conflict of interest concerns were raised about C. Boyden Gray, James Baker, and John Tower. Early press stories emphasized the way in which George Bush would be a "hands-on" president, dealing with the details of policy issues. He also kept working hours from about 7 am to 6 pm, in contrast with Reagan's usual 9 to 5 schedule. Reporters were told of the many phone calls he made every day to "keep in touch" and not allow himself to be isolated by the White House staff. President Reagan had been criticized for refusing to hold press conferences and for not being available for reporters' questions. President Bush held more news conferences in his first 80 days in office than President Reagan did during his last two years in office. Reagan held 50 news conferences in his eight years; they were usually highly structured and lasted precisely 30 minutes.6 Bush's were much less managed and often went beyond the time allotted.7 Bush even invited reporters to social occasions at the White House or at his home in Kennebunkport, Maine.
One of the ironies of these consciously planned contrasts between the two presidents was the White House claim that President Bush had a disdain for the symbolic and rhetorical aspects of the Presidency, implying that Reagan emphasized symbol over substance. After a campaign in which his "handlers" played such an important role, President Bush went out of his way to present himself as spontaneous and non-scripted. "This presidency doesn't have an image maker," asserted Stephen Studdert, a White House aide.8
The cumulation of these conscious contrasts and the willingness of White House staffers to call press attention to them prompted a letter from Richard Nixon to John Sununu. Nixon admonished Sununu and told him that Bush appeared ungrateful for Reagan's support in the campaign and that he might need Reagan's support in the future. Sununu rebuked the White House staff, and Bush called Mr. Reagan to apologize. Bush enjoyed an early honeymoon with the press in which he was favorably contrasted with President Reagan. The honeymoon, however, did not extend to his policy agenda-or rather the asserted lack thereof.
The Bush Policy Agenda
By March 1989 complaints began to be made publicly that the Administration lacked momentum, grand design, new direction, or as George Bush put it, "the vision thing." This perception existed in part because the Administration had become bogged down in the Tower battle with Congress and in part because no largescale new initiatives were seen by the Administration as major priorities of the Bush presidency.
To be sure there were a number of important initiatives: the savings and loan bailout, the Latin American debt crisis, drug initiatives, education proposals, environmental cleanup, ethics proposals, etc.; but nothing dominated the agenda or captured the public imagination.10
In the face of this criticism President Bush felt the need to confront it publicly. "I don't have an agenda where I have to get six items done....I'm not thinking in terms of 100 days."11 "A lot is happening. Not all of it good, but a lot is happening."112 The Administration made the argument that not every presidency ought to have a grand vision or lead the nation off on a new crusade. The Bush Administration, after all, had campaigned on a platform of continuity with the major policies of the Reagan years.
The idea that each new administration ought to accomplish major agenda changes in its first 100 days is relatively new and seldom accomplished. Only unusual circumstances allow newly elected presidents to push through major legislative changes. On the other hand, White House staffers of recent administrations emphasize that if a new president wants to achieve significant policy changes his best opportunity lies within a narrow window at the beginning of an administration. According to H.R. Haldeman, "Your power is going to start eroding from January 20th on." '13 Despite appearances of a lack of strategic vision, President Bush must be given credit for attempting to deal with some of the festering problems left over from the Reagan Administration: a bailout for the savings and loan industry, the clean up of nuclear weapons production plants, and the scandals at the Department of Housing and Urban Development. These were tough issues; on the other hand, critics pointed out that the President seemed willing to take credit for proposing major initiatives in education, the environment, and space exploration without specifying how they would be paid for. The first year of the Administration was not marred by the tensions and rivalries among its major foreign policy officials that had hurt the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan Presidencies. Brent Scowcroft, Richard Cheney, and James Baker had worked together in previous administrations, and President Bush insisted on collegiality.
By the summer of 1989 it appeared that President Bush might have formed the most influential cabinet since President Eisenhower in terms of the willingness of the President to give cabinet secretaries the latitude within which to operate in their jurisdictions. It is ironic that President Bush, one of the few recent Presidents who did not talk about "cabinet government," may have come closest to implementing it. The influence of cabinet secretaries individually, however, did not extend to them as a collectivity. The cabinet met about once a month and was "used more for a briefing session," than for policy deliberation, according to Secretary to the Cabinet David Bates.32 The use of the full cabinet as a deliberative body had greatly diminished since its effective use by President Eisenhower. This was due to its increased size (with 14 cabinet departments in 1989), but more importantly to the cross cutting nature of most presidential policy issues and the president's need for advice from a broader perspective than that of individual department heads.33
While collegiality and relative lack of conflict characterized the early months of the Bush Administration, it must be remembered that Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter began their Administrations with good intentions to delegate to their cabinet secretaries. Each, however, ended up with serious conflicts between cabinet secretaries and White House staffs, and each felt forced to demand resignations from his cabinet appointees.
Political Appointments
The fact that the transition to a Bush administration was a "friendly takeover" was a mixed blessing to personnel recruiter Chase Untermeyer. On the one hand, there was no rush, as there would be with a party-turnover transition, to ensure that the opposition political party was out of office as soon as possible. Those people who chose to remain in policy making positions were loyal Republicans who were no threat to Bush priorities. On the other hand, since they were loyal Republicans and had supported George Bush, many hoped and expected to stay on into a Bush Administration. After all, they had high-level experience, and most were by that time qualified for the positions that they held. Bush's cabinet appointments were widely praised for their experience and competence, and some pointed out the irony of Bush's campaign rhetoric that the election was about ideology rather than competence. According to transition co-director, Craig Fuller, if personnel recruiters erred in selections, they decided "to err on the side of expertise and qualifications for the job. We don't run But the Bush transition was no exception to the general rule that any new president will be attacked by his own party for not appointing enough of the "party faithful." Richard Nixon was attacked by Robert Dole for not appointing enough loyal Republicans. Jimmy Carter was attacked by the Democratic National Committee. Ronald Reagan was attacked by the right wing of his party, through their White House spokesman, Lyn Nofziger, for neglecting the true "Reaganites'"42 President Bush was put under pressure from his own appointees in the demand for appointments. The Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher, Sr., who was finance chairman for the Bush campaign publicly complained that not enough fundraisers were being appointed by the new Administration. "There's this perception...that fund-raisers and fund-givers are nice, interesting people to be sort of patted on the head when you need them and ignored the rest of the time because they don't really understand the process....Quite a high percentage of those who have been helpful haven't gotten anything-at least 50 percent."43 The New York Times reported that there was a "must place" list of 50 major donors who wanted jobs for themselves or for their relatives. The Times also reported that more than a dozen major donors had been appointed to major ambassadorial posts. 44 The ratio of political to career chiefs of mission continued to remain at relativly high levels in the early months of the Administration, evoking expressions of concern that some ambassadorial appointments were undermining the professionalism of U.S. diplomacy. 45 The Administration argued, however, that the percentage of political chiefs of mission would be lower than in the Reagan Administration. 46 In general, however, the Bush personnel operation was not obsessed with narrow definitions of loyalty or White House control of all appointments as was the Reagan administration. 47 The Bush Administration, despite several major exceptions, decided to give significant leeway to Cabinet secretaries to choose, in consultation with the Office of Presidential Personnel, their own management teams at the sub-cabinet level. 48 The argument for this approach is that cabinet secretaries are likely to be motivated to recruit qualified people and they ought to be able to have their own management teams to run their departments. 49 Untermeyer 
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Conclusion: A Presidency of Consolidation
The new Bush Administration was marked by a preference for competence, not ideology. The President's style was one of reactive problem solving, not strategic vision. His approach to Congress (despite the Tower nomination) was one of compromise, not confrontation. His approach to policy disagreements was personal communication and diplomacy rather than "going public" to bring pressure to bear. The conciliatory personal style of the President, however, did not extend to his cabinet secretaries, some of whom were encouraged to take more confrontational positions than the President.60
The Bush presidency in its first year might be characterized as one of consolidation, seeking a "new balance," not confrontation and change. Consolidation was necessary for three reasons: the "Reagan revolution": had worked itself out, the continuing huge deficits precluded large scale new programs, and the continued Democratic control of Congress made compromise part of the price of governing.
The policy changes of the Reagan revolution had worked themselves out over eight years and had gone as far as political forces would allow. Defense spending had increased quickly and substantially, but the increases had leveled off at the end of the Administration. Opinion polls had reversed from 1980 and indicated that the public felt the country was spending enough on defense. The large personal income tax cuts of 1981 were indexed, and the nation was spending much more than it received in revenues. There were significant personnel cuts on the domestic side of the government, though non means-tested entitlements continued to dominate the budget. The control of political appointments, presidential and agency heads, by the White House personnel office reached a peak in the Reagan Administration. That control was not abandoned by the Bush White House, but it was modified in favor of more cabinet input. The attacks on government and the public service that gone on since 1968 were abandoned. The public rhetoric of President Bush about public service was much closer to that of John Kennedy than to Nixon, Carter, or Reagan.
The huge deficits of the 1980s continued into President
The most important criticism of the Administration's first year in office was its failure to attempt any significant reductions in the continuing high budget deficits. Even OMB director Richard Darman in the summer of 1989 condemned "our collective short-sightedness" and "reluctance adequately to address the future" that the national debt and deficits represent. According to Darman the deficit "is the mathematical representation of our wish to buy now, pay later-or, more accurately, buy now and let others pay later."6l Recent research on the presidency has argued that a president's best chance to make major policy changes (without an externally imposed crisis) is in the first year in office. President Bush was thus open to the criticism that he squandered his narrow window of opportunity to deal seriously with the budget deficit. 
